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Abstract Despite the increasing interest in single family
offices (SFOs) as an investment owned by an entrepre-
neurial family, research on SFOs is still in its infancy. In
particular, little is known about the capital structures of
SFOs or the roots of SFO heterogeneity regarding financial
decisions. By drawing on a hand-collected sample of 104
SFOs and private equity (PE) firms, we compare the
financing choices of these two investor types in the context
of direct entrepreneurial investments (DEIs). Our data
thereby provide empirical evidence that SFOs are less
likely to raise debt than PE firms, suggesting that SFOs
follow pecking-order theory. Regarding the heterogeneity
of the financial decisions of SFOs, our data indicate that
the relationship between SFOs and debt financing is rein-
forced by the idiosyncrasies of entrepreneurial families,
such as higher levels of owner management and a higher
firm age. Surprisingly, our data do not support a
moderating effect for the emphasis placed on
socioemotional wealth (SEW).
Keywords Entrepreneurial family . Single family
office . Private equity . Capital structure
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1 Introduction
A single family office (SFO) is an organizational entity
owned by a single entrepreneurial family that manages,
among other things, the assets of the respective family
while pursuing a long-term orientation (Zellweger and
Kammerlander 2015). Although SFO research is still in
its infancy (Welsh et al. 2013), SFOs have increasingly
become an important investment vehicle (e.g., Welsh
et al. 2013; Wessel et al. 2014; Zellweger and
Kammerlander 2015). Therefore, specifically, after the
sale of the original family firm, the SFO may become
the new entrepreneurial (Zellweger et al. 2010) and
financial (Bierl and Kammerlander 2019) focus of the
respective family. Consequently, decisions regarding
the capital structure of SFOs are key, especially when
SFOs make external direct entrepreneurial investments1
Small Bus Econ
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-021-00448-x
1 DEI are (partial) acquisitions of established/mature firms with a
proven business model (Bierl and Kammerlander 2019); these acqui-
sitions are carried out in a “direct” manner (i.e., not via funds).
2 PE firms specialize in equity investments in mature firms and raise
funds from third-party investors; they establish fund structures with a
predefined lifetime and generally use debt to increase return on equity
(e.g., Dawson 2011).
A. Schickinger (*) :N. Kammerlander






University of Bern, Engehaldenstrasse 4, 3012 Bern, Switzerland
e-mail: alexandra.bertschi@iop.unibe.ch
M. P. Leitterstorf
Hochschule Bonn-Rhein-Sieg, Grantham-Allee 20, 53757 Sankt
Augustin, Germany
e-mail: max.leitterstorf@h-brs.de
(DEIs) and thus compete with private equity (PE) firms2
(Block et al. 2019; Rottke and Thiele 2018) that have no
family background and multiple professional investors.
Previous studies on capital structures highlight the
impact of ownership on financial decisions (Bopaiah
1998). PE firms, for example, were found to predominant-
ly follow the trade-off theory (Gompers et al. 2016),
which recognizes that debt is usually cheaper than equity
but, at the same time, increases financial distress and
bankruptcy risk (Harris and Raviv 1991; Stulz 1990),
which leads PE firms to strive to have an optimal mix of
equity and debt (Axelson et al. 2013; Gompers et al.
2016). Business-owning families, in contrast, generally
prefer internal over external financing sources, which is
in line with pecking-order theory (e.g., Gallo and Vilaseca
1996; Reid et al. 1999) and predicts that differences in
agency costs influence financial decisions and result in
hierarchical preferences for internal financing options.
This preference for internal financing is followed by a
preference for external debt and, lastly, equity (Myers
1984; Myers and Majluf 1984).
However, extant academic research analyzing (debt)
financing in family vs. nonfamily structures has found
ambiguous empirical evidence (e.g., Anderson and
Reeb 2003; González et al. 2013) about whether entre-
preneurial families raise more debt (e.g., Gottardo and
Moisello 2014) or less (e.g., Ampenberger et al. 2013;
Mishra and McConaughy 1999). Hence, particularly in
family-owned entities, traditional capital structure theo-
ries alone might not sufficiently explain debt prefer-
ences. Building on this, the behavioral agency model
(BAM) suggests that debt financing decisions are not
static but are largely driven by loss aversion (Wiseman
and Gómez-Mejía 1998), which is higher when an
owning family is involved (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007).
This finding is particularly salient in the context of the
capital structure decisions of entrepreneurial families
outside the family firm (i.e., in an SFO), as SFOs are at
the intersection between financial decision-making and
family cohesion and thus constitute a fruitful context for
debt discussions (Rivo-López et al. 2017; Wessel et al.
2014). Furthermore, SFO decision-making is affected
by the unique aspects of family involvement, such as
combined ownership management (e.g., Hutchinson
1995; Pierce et al. 2001), transgenerational intentions
(e.g., González et al. 2013; Schulze et al. 2003), and the
pursuit of noneconomic goals related to socioemotional
wealth (SEW) (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; Molly
et al. 2019).
Surprisingly, academic knowledge on the influence
of SFO-owning families on capital structure decisions as
well as how entrepreneurial families’ unique idiosyn-
crasies (e.g., owner-management, transgenerational in-
tentions, SEW) affect such decisions is still limited.
Thus, we pose the following research questions: How
do SFOs and PE firms differ in terms of debt financing
in the context of DEI? How do factors such as owner
management, firm age, or the importance of SEW influ-
ence the use of debt for SFOs? To answer these research
questions, we draw on capital structure theories (trade-
off and pecking-order; Myers 1977, 1984) and the BAM
(Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía 1998) to derive hypothe-
ses for the debt financing preferences of SFOs (com-
pared with PE firms) as well as on the influence of
entrepreneurial families’ idiosyncrasies on the relation-
ship between SFOs and capital structure. We empirical-
ly test our hypotheses on a hand-collected sample of 104
SFOs and PE firms. Overall, we reveal a significant,
negative relationship between SFOs (compared to PE
firms) and debt financing. Moreover, we find that the
degree of owner management and firm age negatively
impact the direct effect. Counterintuitively, we do not
find empirical evidence for an interaction with SEW.
Our study contributes to the academic literature in at
least two important ways. First, our empirical findings add
to the literature on SFOs and their capital structure deci-
sions (e.g., Bacci et al. 2018; Gottardo andMoisello 2014;
Koropp et al. 2013) by comparing SFOs (with a family
background) with PE firms (without any family influ-
ence). Our data provide empirical evidence that family-
owned SFOs favor relying solely on internal financing
and only raising debt when no internal financing is avail-
able. This finding expands extant knowledge on SFOs’
debt financing decisions (i.e., Molly et al. 2019) by show-
ing that due to their unique structures, SFOs follow
pecking-order theory and thereby strongly differ from
PE firms (Gallo and Vilaseca 1996; Gompers et al. 2016).
Second, we contribute to the literature on the hetero-
geneity among SFO capital structures stemming from
the unique idiosyncrasies of the involvement of an en-
trepreneurial family (Block et al. 2018; Welsh et al.
2013; Zellweger et al. 2012b). In particular, we analyze
the moderating effects of owner management, firm age,
and the importance of SEW on debt financing decisions
of SFOs. We provide empirical evidence that increased
levels of owner management and firm age, along with
loss aversion (Chrisman and Patel 2012), further de-
crease the propensity of SFOs to seek debt financing.
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Counterintuitively, and in contrast with extant research
(Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007), our data do not provide
evidence for SEW being a relevant contingency. We
might speculate that either SEW is also important to
nonfamily structures (i.e., PE firms) or that the impor-
tance of SEW generally does not affect financial deci-
sions (Molly et al. 2019).
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Capital structure theories in family firms
Researchers have long studied capital structures of dif-
ferent firm types and have sought to explain—among
other things—the mix of equity and debt for a firm and
what factors influence the underlying decision-making
process (Gompers et al. 2016). However, given the
multitude of factors influencing financial decisions
(Myers 2001), our understanding of capital structure
decisions in family entities remains incomplete.
The trade-off theory predicts an optimal capital struc-
ture (i.e., a target debt to equity ratio) based on the balance
between the costs and benefits of using debt (Harris and
Raviv 1991; Myers 1977; Stulz 1990). The foremost
advantages of debt financing are the tax-deductibility of
interest payments (called “tax shield”) and the potential
avoidance of liquidity issues. However, a high level of
debt also involves the costs of financial distress, a higher
bankruptcy risk (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973), and the
costs of the information asymmetries between share-
holders and creditors (Jensen andMeckling 1976). Hence,
the resulting optimal capital structure differs among firms,
depending on the firm’s characteristics, available assets,
and business models (Myers 1984).
In contrast with trade-off theory (which solely distin-
guishes between equity and debt), pecking-order theory
(Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984) assumes that
there is no optimal capital structure. Specifically,
decision-makers have the objective of minimizing the
costs of the information asymmetries between internal
and external agents because such costs (e.g., monitoring
and transparency requirements) might result in less fa-
vorable debt conditions. Pecking-order theory thus pos-
tulates that in cases of information asymmetries, financ-
ing decisions are based on hierarchical preferences.
Specifically, decision-makers will opt for internal fi-
nancing and will only opt for the capital market if
internal financing options are insufficient (Myers 1984).
While originally developed for publicly traded firms,
an increasing number of scholars also apply the two
theories in the context of private structures (Michaelas
et al. 1999), for which the outcomes, however, seem to
be more nuanced than for other types of firms. For
example, scholars widely agree that PE firms primarily
follow the trade-off theory (Gompers et al. 2016) and
raise as much debt as they can (Axelson et al. 2013,
Gompers et al. 2016). In contrast, some family firm
financing researchers find that families follow a
pecking-order hierarchy and prefer external debt over
external equity when additional financing is sought
(Blanco-Mazagatos et al. 2007; Poutziouris 2001),
whereas other studies indicate a negative relation be-
tween family ownership and debt financing in both
public and private family firms (Gallo and Vilaseca
1996; Mishra and McConaughy 1999). The latter is
explained by the fear of bankruptcy and the aim to
maintain control (Gallo and Vilaseca 1996; Mishra and
McConaughy 1999). Although these studies highlight
differences among business families regarding the will-
ingness to use debt, they indicate a general preference
for internal over external financing options and thus
follow a hierarchical approach in line with pecking-
order theory.
To explain the observed heterogeneity in family firm
capital structures, several scholars emphasize the need
for the integration of nontraditional theoretical ap-
proaches, such as incorporating behavioral aspects. For
example, Hutchinson (1995) stresses that behavioral
aspects mitigate the demand for financing in small
owner-managed firms. Other scholars emphasize that
risk aversion and owners’/managers’ individual goals
affect debt financing (Barton and Matthews 1989;
Romano et al. 2001). Given that behavior might serve
as an explanation for why entrepreneurial families prefer
certain capital structures, in the following, we analyze
the interaction of the BAM and traditional capital struc-
ture theories to increase our understanding of financing
decisions.
2.2 The role of the behavioral agency model and loss
aversion in capital structures
Financial decisions and risky decision-making can often
be explained by the BAM (Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía
1998), which challenges the general assumption of static
risk-taking preferences but suggests that decisions are
based on problem framing and loss aversion (Cyert and
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March 1963; Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía 1998), which
means that decisions are evaluated against potential
gains and losses (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2010; Kahneman
and Tversky 1979) and that the prevention of losses is
considered more important than obtaining gains
(Chrisman and Patel 2012). However, to date, findings
on family firm decision-making processes with respect
to their capital structure are mixed.
Concerning the level of debt, González et al. (2013),
for instance, find that the need for financial growth
without the loss of control leads to higher debt levels.
Additionally, they find that older firms tend to raise
more debt than younger firms, which they relate to the
founders’ assumed high levels of risk aversion com-
pared with that of their heirs (e.g., González et al.
2013; King and Santor 2008). Studies showing that
family firms raise similar debt levels as nonfamily firms
(e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003) indicate that business-
owning families do not adjust their capital structure
decisions to reduce risk (Amore et al. 2011; Anderson
and Reeb 2003). In contrast, studies finding a negative
effect of family ownership on debt financing (e.g.,
Ampenberger et al. 2013; Mishra and McConaughy
1999), especially for family firms with a high market
share within the respective industry (Gallo and Vilaseca,
1996), indicate a higher fear of bankruptcy (often asso-
ciated with personal bankruptcy) and a stronger identi-
fication of the family with the firm.
Although the academic literature has, to date, yielded
inconsistent findings with respect to the debt levels of
family vs. nonfamily firms, most studies stress that
business-owning families prefer internal over external
financing options (e.g., Gallo and Vilaseca 1996; Reid
et al. 1999) due to owners’/manager’s pursuit of non-
economic values and the fear of loss of control, thus
producing their risk aversion (e.g., Barton andMatthews
1989; Romano et al. 2001). However, if internal financ-
ing options are insufficient, then business-owning fam-
ilies might first turn to debt before considering equity
(e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003; González et al. 2013),
in line with pecking-order theory.
While extant research has primarily focused on the
drivers of capital structure decisions within the family
firm, the influence of entrepreneurial families on debt
financing may be even more salient in financing deci-
sions outside the family firm, such as in an SFO. SFO-
owning families likely differ from business-owning fam-
ilies in their preferences for raising debt, although both
types basically rely on an entrepreneurial family
(Schickinger et al. 2020). In particular, these types of
entities differ to a certain extent in terms of their gover-
nance structures (a united group of family owners vs. the
SFO as an intermediary structure; Zellweger and
Kammerlander 2015), portfolio of investments (original
family firm vs. outside entrepreneurial investments; Bierl
and Kammerlander 2019), entrepreneurial behavior
across generations (the intention to pass on
entrepreneurial investments to the next generation or
not; Schickinger et al. 2020), or preferences regarding
financial resources (debt vs. equity). With respect to the
latter, SFOs are more likely to focus on internal financial
resources to avoid external pressure, whereas family
firms often require funding for technological enhance-
ments or market extensions to remain competitive (e.g.,
Sirmon and Hitt 2003). Increasing our academic under-
standing of the debt preferences of SFOs seems crucial to
gain a more holistic picture of entrepreneurial families’
external debt financing choices.
3 Hypotheses development
3.1 The impact of SFOs versus PE firms on capital
structure
To further investigate families’ capital structure deci-
sions outside the family firm, we follow recent calls of
SFO scholars that stress the importance of comparing
SFOs with other types of investors without a family
background, such as PE firms (Block et al. 2019;
Rottke and Thiele 2018). To do so, we shed light on
the key benefits and costs that, according to capital
structure theories (trade-off and pecking-order) (Myers
1977, 1984) as well as the BAM (Wiseman and Gómez-
Mejía 1998), come with debt financing in the context of
DEI investments: the benefit of deductible interest pay-
ments and the cost of financial distress (Kraus and
Litzenberger 1973). With regard to the benefits of de-
ductible interest payments, we assume that the interest
tax shield is identical for both SFOs and PE firms,
whereas regarding the costs of financial distress, the line
of argument is linked first to diversification and, second,
to bankruptcy consequences.
First, although SFOs are generally well diversified in
terms of their overall portfolio (Rivo-López et al. 2017),
they often suffer from an inadequately diversified allo-
cation of DEI due to their large investments in single
portfolio firms and their frequent aversion to external
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financing, corresponding with pecking-order theory. In
contrast, as PE firms, which frequently following the
trade-off theory, draw capital from multiple external
investors, their assets under management in DEI are
generally higher than those of an SFO (Block et al.
2019), which enables PE firms to better diversify re-
garding firm size or firm life cycle (Rottke and Thiele
2018). Second, bankruptcy consequences are more se-
vere for SFO-owning families because of the family’s
wealth concentration and their private benefits as pre-
scribed by the BAM (Cyert and March 1963; Wiseman
and Gómez-Mejía 1998). Thus, the BAM predicts that
the cost of financial distress is higher for SFOs (similar
to family firms) than for PE firms (similar to nonfamily
firms) (c.f. López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar 2007).
In sum, the risk associated with debt increases in less-
diversified portfolios (such as for SFOs), and financial
hardship is higher for loss-averse SFO-owning families.
Hence, according to the BAM, we propose that SFOs
are less likely to use higher debt levels than PE firms.
Moreover, since SFOs are entities that are funded
with family equity, their investment decisions depend
on the respective family but are typically independent of
predefined targets (Bierl and Kammerlander 2019;
Rottke and Thiele 2018). Therefore, SFOs benefit from
the option of solely relying on internal financing (their
first hierarchical preference with zero leverage; Myers
1984) when making DEIs. In contrast, PE firms gener-
ally require debt to meet predefined, often ambitious
returns for investors (Dawson 2011). Thus, based on
pecking-order theory and the BAM, we expect SFOs to
be less likely to use the same or higher debt levels than
PE firms because SFOs have the option of relying on
internal financing (and thereby avoiding bankruptcy
risk) instead of raising debt, whereas PE firms need to
use debt to achieve predefined returns. In sum, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Single family offices raise less
debt when financing direct entrepreneurial invest-
ments than PE firms.
3.2 The moderating effect of entrepreneurial family
idiosyncrasies on investment decisions
While ownership structure may impact debt financing
decisions, as just hypothesized, this relationship is likely
further affected by three characteristics that are
idiosyncratic to family investors (Gómez-Mejía et al.
2018). First, the overlap of ownership and management
structures typically results in a sense of high psycholog-
ical ownership towards the firm and a correspondingly
increased need for control (e.g., Bacci et al. 2018; Pierce
et al. 2001; Romano et al. 2001). Second, firms with a
family background often span generations and are thus
old and well established in their environment, which
increases the intention to establish transgenerational
control (e.g., González et al. 2013; Schulze et al. 2003;
Zellweger et al. 2012a). Third, business families pursue
noneconomic goals (e.g., Molly et al. 2019) related to
SEW and thus seek to protect their SEW endowment
(Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). In the following, we analyze
how these typical idiosyncrasies moderate the relation-
ship between ownership structure and debt financing.
3.2.1 The moderating effect of owner management
In SFOs, financial decisions are frequently made by the
owning families (shareholders) who are the sole investor
in the financial structure (Rottke and Thiele 2018). The
extant literature has revealed that such family owner
managers may have a sense of greater psychological
ownership towards the firm due to their autonomy and
independent decision-making (Douglas and Shepherd
2000; Pierce et al. 2001), family tradition, close bonds
between members, or nostalgia about the past (Sharma
and Manikutty 2005). Therefore, psychological owner-
ship has been found to be a key driver of loss aversion
(Ariely et al. 2005; Chrisman and Patel 2012; Townsend
et al. 2009)—which might further strengthen the financ-
ing preferences noted before. Thus, in line with pecking-
order theory, we assume that psychological ownership
may encourage owner managers of SFOs to avoid debt
financing because of the fear of a loss of control.
Similarly, previous literature found that owner man-
agers of family structures (i.e., SFOs) are generally more
risk- and loss-averse than nonowner managers or owner
managers of nonfamily structures (i.e., PE firms) (Gallo
et al. 2004; McConaughy et al. 2001). Hence, although
pecking-order theory emphasizes that debt is preferred
as an external financing option, family owner managers
often associate additional costs (i.e., monitoring, con-
trolling) and fears (loss of control) with the use of
external financing (McConaughy et al. 2001). In con-
trast, PE owner managers are less likely to face such
aversion towards external financing because PE funds
already generate highly regulated and formal reports for
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auditors and investors (Rottke and Thiele 2018). In sum,
we argue that the more profound psychological owner-
ship (Ariely et al. 2005) and the general loss aversion of
SFO-owning families are (Gallo et al. 2004;
McConaughy et al. 2001), the more negative the attitude
of the SFO towards debt financing for DEI will be.
Hence, we argue the following:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The relationship between the
type of investor and the likelihood of debt financing
for direct entrepreneurial investments is moderated
by owner management. Specifically, single family
offices, in contrast with PE firms, have even less
debt when the percentage of shareholders on the
management board increases.
3.2.2 The moderating effect of firm age
Moreover, the structures of SFOs are frequently charac-
terized by a long period of family ownership often
approximated with firm age (Zellweger et al. 2012a).
Such extended ownership periods might positively in-
fluence access to debt financing because of longer track
records and banking relationships (Michiels and Molly
2017). However, over a longer period of ownership, the
identity of the respective owner is often inextricably
linked with the identity of the firm (Berrone et al.
2010; Cruz et al. 2010), and family owners seek
transgenerational control (Zellweger et al. 2012a).
While some scholars argue that founders are more
risk-averse than their descendants (Gómez-Mejía et al.
2007; González et al. 2013), the majority of studies
highlight that descendants are generally more risk- and
loss-averse (Molly et al. 2012; Schulze et al. 2003).
Accordingly, Reid et al. (1999) find that firm age neg-
atively affects the use of debt because older family firms
led by descendants show increased levels of fear of
losing control and/or wealth.
In the context of SFOs, we expect a similar relation-
ship because the SFO might become the new emotional
anchor of the family, especially after the sale of the
original family firm (Bierl and Kammerlander 2019).
Thus, firm age may strengthen the negative relationship
between SFOs and debt financing because changes in
reference points over time (e.g., through succession)
may foster loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky
1979) and mitigate risk-taking behavior (Kempers
et al. 2017). In line with the literature, we argue that
the new reference point of SFO-owning families is
inherited wealth and the inextricable link of family
identity to the SFO (c.f., Berrone et al. 2010; Cruz
et al. 2010). In contrast, PE firms may be less likely to
become risk- and loss-averse over time because—
building on trade-off theory—their predefined targets
(Dawson 2011) encourage PE firms (independent of
age) to raise as much debt as they can. The higher the
return on equity is, the higher the compensation for PE
managers and the higher the satisfaction of investors
will be (Chung et al. 2012).
In sum, we argue that SFOs have even less debt when
firm age increases as changes in reference points of
SFO-owning families foster the pecking-order approach
and loss aversion. Thus, SFOs may define less ambi-
tious performance targets than PE firms and consequent-
ly raise even lower debt levels to meet these demands.
Hence, we argue the following:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The relationship between the
type of investor and the likelihood of debt financing
for direct entrepreneurial investments is moderated
by firm age. Specifically, single family offices, in
contrast with PE firms, have even less debt when
firm age increases.
3.2.3 The moderating effect of the importance of SEW
Finally, while family firm research generally links the
importance of SEW to the family firm itself (Chirico
et al. 2019), recent findings also acknowledge its impor-
tance for SFOs, which may even persist after the sale of
the family firm (Schickinger et al. 2020). First, the desire
to perpetuate family control, an important SEW dimen-
sion, may decrease the debt financing of SFOs because
families aim to maintain transgenerational control and
influence in the long term (Block et al. 2018; Lumpkin
and Brigham 2011). Specifically, raising debt from ex-
ternal creditors is, according to pecking-order theory,
typically accompanied by increasing information
asymmetries (Myers 1984) and monitoring require-
ments (Barry and Mihov 2015), which might diminish
family control and influence within the SFO. In contrast,
maintaining control and avoiding transparency towards
creditors may be less pressing for PE firms because of
their nonfamily structure and regulated nature, causing
them to file reports for auditors and investors indepen-
dent of creditor requirements (Rottke and Thiele 2018).
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Second, the pursuit of SEW-related goals may further
decrease debt financing of SFOs due to the higher costs
of financial distress (Gallo and Vilaseca 1996; Mishra
and McConaughy 1999; Strebulaev and Yang 2013), as
raising debt increases the risk of bankruptcy and a
corresponding loss of SEW. Given that entrepreneurial
families are loss averse (Cyert and March 1963; Wise-
man and Gómez-Mejía 1998), the increasing economic
utility from financing (large-scale) projects with debt
may not outweigh the additional risk of losing SEW.
In contrast, such SEW-related reasons may affect PE
firms less than SFOs because of their nonfamily struc-
ture and their ambitious performance targets (Mietzner
and Schweizer 2014), which limit them from consider-
ing noneconomic goals at the expense of profits.
In sum, we argue that entrepreneurial families also
consider noneconomic aspects that meet affective needs
(Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007) and are loss-averse when
SEW is threatened. In line with pecking-order theory,
these families aim to rely on as much internal financing
as possible to maintain family control within the SFO
(Block et al. 2018). Moreover, raising debt would in-
crease bankruptcy risk and consequently the risk of
losing SEW (Mishra and McConaughy 1999;
Strebulaev and Yang 2013), whereas internal financing
options would preserve SEW. Thus, we argue the
following:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The relationship between the
type of investor and the likelihood of debt financing
for direct entrepreneurial investments is moderated
by the importance of SEW. Specifically,
single family offices, in contrast with PE firms,
have even less debt when the importance of SEW
increases.
4 Methodology
4.1 Sample and data collection
We test our hypotheses using a sample of German-
speaking SFOs and PE firms because entrepreneurial
families represent the backbone of the German, Austri-
an, and Swiss economies and have a long-standing
tradition (De Massis et al. 2018). We performed multi-
ple steps to identify study participants given the im-
mense lack of transparency and the difficulty in
obtaining reliable information on SFOs and PE firms
(Amit et al. 2008; Cumming and Groh 2018). Specifi-
cally, in the context of SFOs, it is challenging to obtain
access to study participants because SFOs are privately
held, generally have no legal obligation to disclose
information, and often minimize public appearances to
maintain their confidential nature (Decker and Lange
2013). As such, previous SFO and PE studies generally
rely on small sample sizes (Welsh et al. 2013, Michels
et al. 2020). Moreover, we further constrained our study
because we only included SFOs with a focus on DEI.
Given that only a limited portion of all SFOs conduct
DEI, we could only determine whether an SFO had
experience with DEI during private discussions with
representatives of SFOs.
The study included three phases of data collec-
tion. First, we identified possible SFO study par-
ticipants and conducted semistructured interviews
with family members or senior managers of SFOs.
Second, we identified possible PE study partici-
pants and conducted interviews with PE managers.
Third, we collected data from the Amadeus data-
base, which includes ownership information for
firms based in Europe.
4.1.1 Phase 1: Search process and semistructured
interviews with SFOs
Given that there is no complete database on German-
speaking SFOs, we identified potential study partici-
pants in multiple steps. First, we based our search pro-
cess on the Listenchampion database (Listenchampion
2017) (86 SFOs) and the (partial) member list of VuFO3
(13 SFOs). Next, we included 146 SFOs via manual and
extensive internet research and 105 SFOs via individual
contacts, resulting in a database of 350 German-
speaking SFOs. In the last step, we eliminated 54 SFOs
because of their real estate focus and 25 SFOs because
of their liquidated or pure offshore structures, obsolete
postal addresses, or inapplicable SFO types (i.e., multi-
family offices). The final list included 271 German-
speaking SFOs.
In August 2017, we physically mailed a short re-
search introduction and followed up by phone and
email. Ultimately, 109 SFOs agreed to participate in
our study. However, we focused on only 53 SFOs
because they actively engaged in DEIs. Out of these
53 SFOs, we had to exclude three SFOs because they
sent their questionnaire responses by email with
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questionable data quality (two SFOs) or were in the
process of planning a DEI (one SFO), resulting in a
final list of 50 SFOs and a response rate of 18%
(based on the 271 identified SFOs). Between Septem-
ber 2017 and June 2018, we conducted interviews
with a family member (56% of the SFOs) or a senior
manager (44% of the SFOs) of the SFOs. Seventy
percent of all interviews were conducted in personal
meetings and 30% were conducted by phone. In terms
of regional allocation, 92% of all SFO interviewees
were based in Germany and 4% were in Switzerland
and Austria each.
4.1.2 Phase 2: Search process and semistructured
interviews with PE firms
Similar to the search process for SFOs, we identified PE
study participants in several steps and focused on small-
to mid-cap PE firms. First, we based our sample on the
Listenchampion database (Listenchampion 2018) (74
PE firms). Next, we included 26 PE firms via extensive
and manual research and personal contacts, resulting in
100 German-speaking small- to mid-cap PE firms.
In March 2018, we sent a short research introduction
by email and followed up by phone and email. Ultimate-
ly, 55 PE firms agreed to participate. In line with the
SFO procedure, we excluded one PE firm because it
sent its questionnaire responses by email, resulting in 54
PE firms (and a response rate of 54%). We interviewed
CEOs (44%) and senior managers (56%) until
June 2018. The interviews were conducted by phone
(82%) or in personal meetings (18%). A total of 98% of
all interviewees were based in Germany and 2% were
based in Switzerland.
4.1.3 Phase 3: Quantitative database research
In addition to the interviews, we supplemented our
dataset with public information on ownership and
management structures from the Amadeus database
in January 2018 and obtained information on all 104
participating firms. We regarded Amadeus (Bureau
van Dijk) as an adequate source because it contains
detailed ownership information, data on board mem-
bers and the number of shares held and ensures that its
records are updated through regulatory filings and its
own proprietary sources.
4.2 Common method bias
We took several steps before and during the data col-
lection process to minimize the risk of common method
bias. First, given that our questionnaire items were pri-
marily fact-based (Tourangeau et al. 2000), our vari-
ables are unlikely to be affected by such issues (Chang
et al. 2010; Crampton and Wagner 1994). Second, our
study variables were embedded in a comprehensive
questionnaire on entrepreneurial behavior, activities,
and organizational structures and did not reveal any
potential, assumed relationships among constructs. It is
thus unlikely that the interviewees adjusted their an-
swers in line with expectations. Third, we assured strict
confidentiality and thereby minimized the probability of
socially desirable answers (Podsakoff et al. 2003).
Additionally, we conducted the Harman single factor
test (Podsakoff and Organ 1986), a principal component
factor analysis of all the study variables. The analysis
revealed three factors with eigenvalues greater than one,
with no single factor explaining the majority of vari-
ance. Moreover, we conducted a marker variable test to
investigate correlations between the dependent variable
(i.e., debt financing) and the marker variable (i.e., the
importance of human capital in the target portfolio
firm4), which are theoretically unrelated to and uncorre-
lated with the focal variables (Lindell and Whitney
2001). The significances of the correlations between
the main and revised models were not substantially
different (Van Doorn and Verhoef 2008). In sum, com-
monmethod bias will unlikely distort the findings of our
study (Podsakoff et al. 2003).
4.3 Measures
The survey was conducted in German. To ensure accu-
racy and maximum comprehensibility, we applied an
iterative, two-way translation (Dickson et al. 2006) from
English to German for established scales. Given that
objective and public data on SFOs and PE firms are
scarce (Amit et al. 2008; Cumming and Groh 2018),
most measures (except for owner management) were
self-reported. However, previous studies have shown
that financial data, such as debt levels reported by
4 Study participants were asked to indicate the importance of human
capital in the decision-making process when (partially) acquiring
established firms. The question was assessed on a five-point Likert
scale.
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executives, are typically reliable (Tan and Litschert
1994), especially when reported anonymously
(Dillman 1978).
4.3.1 Dependent variable: Debt financing
In line with Schulze et al. (2003), we measured debt
financing as an ordinal-dependent variable5 of a firm’s
debt-to-equity ratio when financing DEI. The debt
levels range from one to four, coded as “1” if no debt
was raised, “2” for debt levels of 1–25%, “3” for debt
levels of 26–50%, and “4” for debt levels of 51–100%.
Unlike Schulze et al. (2003), our data sample does not
include debt levels over 100%. We thus excluded the
suggested categories “5” for debt levels of 101–200%
and “6” for debt levels over 200%.
4.3.2 Independent variable: Type of investor
We measured the independent binary variable, type of
investor, by assessing whether the study participant
represents an SFO (coded as “1”) or a PE firm (coded
as “0”).
4.3.3 Moderating variables
Owner management To identify the degree of owner
management, we determined the percentage of share-
holders on the management board from the Amadeus
database. For SFOs, we used the percentage of SFO-
owning family members on the management board. For
PE firms, we referred to the percentage of general part-
ners on the management board, given that general part-
ners (in contrast with limited partners) are liable without
limitation and responsible for any outstanding debt in
case of bankruptcy (Veith 2008). We measured the
degree of owner management as a continuous variable,
ranging from 0 to 100 (percent).
Firm age To identify firm age, we determined the time
between 2018 and the firm founding year (Pfaffermayr
2009). We measured firm age as a continuous variable
(in years).
SEWi To identify the importance of noneconomic
goals, we assessed the SEWi (socioemotional wealth
importance) scale, developed by Debicki et al. (2016).
This scale consists of nine questions on the importance
of noneconomic aspects, rated on a five-point Likert
scale (from 1 “not important” to 5 “very important”).
The scale was originally developed for family firms; we
applied it to our sample because (1) SFOs are closely
connected to family firms and are typically established
by (former) business-owning families (Bierl and
Kammerlander 2019; Decker and Lange 2013) and (2)
although SEW is generally linked to family ownership,
PE firms may also value certain SEW characteristics
(e.g., importance of reputation). After a thorough assess-
ment throughout the interview process, we eliminated
two items6 that focused on the importance of obtaining
appreciation from the general public and pursuing social
ties. These questions do not apply to our sample because
many SFOs intentionally minimize public appearances
to maintain a secretive and confidential nature (Decker
and Lange 2013). The Cronbach’s alphas are .61 for
SFOs and .57 for PE firms, which suggest adequate
internal reliability (Kline 2013). To capture the impor-
tance of SEW, we calculated the average of the seven
responses of each study participant.
Control variables First, we controlled for firm size be-
cause larger organizations are more likely to raise debt
than smaller ones (Harris and Raviv 1991). We mea-
sured firm size as the number of employees within the
SFO or PE firm (continuous variable). Next, we con-
trolled for club deal investments because coinvestments
might trigger the perceived individual risk differently (in
comparison with single investments) given that poten-
tial investment gains as well as losses are shared among
multiple investors. We assessed this variable as a binary
variable (1 = primarily club deal investor; 0 = primarily
single investor). Last, we controlled for the number of
current holdings because investors with a larger number
5 Throughout our interviews, our SFO study participants particularly
emphasized the hierarchical preference structure of pecking-order the-
ory (Myers 1984; Myers andMajluf, 1984): The underlying concern of
debt financing for SFO-owning families is not related to the degree of
debt financing but rather to whether they raise debt at all to finance
DEI. We therefore collected data based on a categorical range, as
suggested by Schulze et al. (2003).
6 Eliminated survey questions: (1) “If it is important that the family
gains recognition and appreciation in our community, as a firmwewill
engage in actions that have the greatest potential to benefit the family
in this regard” and (2) “How important is it that the family can benefit
from the social relationships developed through our business, and
vice-versa (that the business benefits from our family’s
relationships)?”.
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of holdings benefit from a higher level of portfolio
diversification and might therefore be more willing to
take risks when raising debt. We assessed current hold-




The descriptive statistics, including the means, standard
deviations, correlation matrix, and variance inflation
factors for all variables, are presented in Table 1. In
the regression model, we used the natural logarithm of
firm size to minimize skewness. For a better interpreta-
tion, we additionally included the raw values of firm
size in the presented tables. Table 1 shows acceptable
levels of correlation (i.e., below the threshold of .30)
between independent and control variables (Hair et al.
2010).We also addressed issues of multicollinearity and
examined the variance inflation factors. Specifically,
with the highest variance inflation factor at 1.85 and
the mean variance inflation factor at 1.28, the values are
below the generally proposed threshold of 10 (Hair et al.
2010). These results indicate that multicollinearity is not
an issue in our study. Moreover, as this study compares
German-speaking SFOs to PE firms, we used t test
analyses to compare characteristics and to gain a better
understanding of the differences among the two sample
groups. We found only few significant differences in
debt financing, firm size, and SEWi. These findings are
presented in Table 2.
In a first step, we checked whether our sample was
representative of the total population of German-
speaking SFO and PE firms. Overall, our SFO sample
accounts for 30% of the entire (estimated) SFO universe
in Germany (Bierl and Kammerlander 2018), our PE
sample accounts for approximately 36% of all small-
and midcap PE firms in Germany (Listenchampion,
2020). We thus expect that this significant proportion
of the overall population provides a representative pic-
ture. Moreover, putting this situation in a broader per-
spective within developed countries, we assume steady
descriptive results within the PE universe because the
investment concepts of PE firms are very similar inter-
nationally. In the context of SFOs, the results may vary
because access to debt and cultural specifications
(among others) may differ.
The sample consists of 104 firms: 50 SFOs (48.10%)
and 54 PE firms (51.90%). The mean debt-to-equity
ratio of all the study participants is 2.32 (s.d. = 1.04).
The means of the debt-to-equity ratios of SFOs and PE
firms show statistically significant differences
(p = .000). Specifically, the mean debt-to-equity ratio
of SFOs is 1.86, and the mean debt-to-equity ratio of
PE firms is 2.74. Moreover, the average percentage of
owners on the management board is 64.51% (s.d. =
41.23; 65.72% in SFOs vs. 63.39% in PE firms), and
the average firm age is 17.38 years (s.d. = 11.21 years;
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, correlation matrix, and variance inflation factors
Variables Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. Debt financing 2.317 1.036 1.000
2. Firm size 20.861 41.880 .179† 1.000
3. Club deal investments .433 .498 .127 .107 1.000
4. Current holdings 12.238 17.797 − .046 .127 .036 1.000
5. Owner management 64.510 41.225 − .182† − .264** −.096 −.227* 1.000
6. Firm age 17.375 11.213 .225* .253** − .054 .086 − .195* 1.000
7. SEWi 3.841 .550 .012 − .128 − .014 .110 .040 − .033 1.000
8. Type of investor .481 .502 − .427*** − .223* .014 .034 .028 − .015 .225* 1.000
Variance inflation factor 1.28 1.85 1.03 1.19 1.23 1.30 1.11 1.27
N = 104; † p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
s.d., standard deviation
Ordered DV: debt financing: (1) no debt, (2) low debt levels of 1–25%, (3) medium debt levels of 26–50%, (4) high debt levels of 51–100%
Binary IV: type of investor (0 = PE firm; 1 = SFO)
SEWi, socioemotional wealth importance
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17.20 years for SFOs vs. 17.54 years for PE firms). The
means of the SFOs and PE firms for these two item
characteristics show no statistically significant differ-
ences. Last, the respondents rated the importance of
SEW on average at 3.84 (s.d. = .55; based on a five-
point Likert scale). In line with our theoretical reason-
ing, we find significant differences (p = .022) in the
mean importance of SEW between SFOs (3.97) and
PE firms (3.72). Further descriptive findings are
highlighted in Table 1 and Table 2.
5.2 Regression results
We calculated ordered logit models to test the direct and
moderated effects of the binary independent variable
type of investor on the ordinal dependent outcome debt
financing. Table 3 presents the results of the analysis.
Model 1 presents the findings of our baseline specifica-
tion containing only control variables. Model 2 includes
the independent variable type of investor and the
moderator variables, testing for the direct effect on debt
financing (H1). Model 3 adds the interaction between
type of investor and owner management, firm age, and
SEWi simultaneously to the former specification and
allows testing for moderating effects (H2–4).
Model 1 shows that the natural logarithm of firm size
is positively and significantly related to debt financing
(ẞ = .626, p = .002). In contrast, the control variables
club deal investments and current holdings are not sig-
nificantly related to debt financing. Model 2 shows that
the type of investor affects debt financing negatively and
significantly (ẞ = − 1.966, p = .000). This result indi-
cates that SFOs (coded as “1”) are less likely to raise
high levels of debt when investing in DEI than PE firms
(coded as “0”). Thus, we find empirical support for
Hypothesis 1. The pseudo-R2 value of .138 for model
2 indicates a good model fit.
In model 3, first, the interaction between the type of
investor and owner management has a negative and
significant effect on debt financing (ẞ = − .022,
Table 3 Ordered logit regression of debt financing
Debt financinga
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Control variables
Firm size (ln) .626** (.205) .070 (.278) .099 (.289)
Club deal investments .497 (.382) .566 (.404) .629 (.420)
Current holdings − .018 (.014) − .012 (.014) − .020 (.014)
Moderators
Owner management −.008 (.005) .002 (.007)
Firm age .039† (.020) .072** (.027)
SEWi .652 (.401) .101 (.618)
Independent variable
Type of investor −1.966*** (.483) −2.874 (3.304)
Interaction terms
Type of investor × owner management − .022* (.010)
Type of investor × firm age − .088* (.040)
Type of investor × SEWi .982 (.831)
Log-likelihood − 114.350 − 103.658 − 99.130
Pseudo-R2 .049 .138 .175
Observations 104 104 104
This table presents results for regressions with standard errors in parentheses
† p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
aOrdered DV: debt financing: (1) no debt, (2) low debt levels of 1–25%, (3) medium debt levels of 26–50%, (4) high debt levels of 51–100%
Binary IV: type of investor (0 = PE firm; 1 = SFO)
SEWi, socioemotional wealth importance
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p = .037). This result indicates that owner management
strengthens the negative relationship between SFOs and
debt financing, in line with Hypothesis 2. Second, the
interaction between type of investor and firm age is
negatively and significantly associated with debt financ-
ing (ẞ = − .088, p = .028). Thus, firm age strengthens
the negative relationship between SFOs and debt financ-
ing, in line with Hypothesis 3. Last, we find that the
interaction effect of the type of investor and SEWi does
not significantly affect debt financing, leading us to
reject Hypothesis 4. The pseudo-R2 value of .175 for
model 3 indicates a good model fit.
5.3 Robustness analysis
5.3.1 Proportional odds
An implicit assumption of the underlying ordered logit
regression is that the relationship between each outcome
group is identical (parallel regression assumption). In
this context, the identical relationship means that the
“slope” estimates between each of the four debt levels
across SFOs and PE firms are assumed to be the same.
In line with best practices (Long and Freese 2014), we
utilize the likelihood ratio test and the Brant test to
analyze whether the parallel regression assumption has
been violated. The nonsignificant statistics of the likeli-
hood ratio test (probability > chi2 = .224) and of the
Brant test (probability > chi2 = 1.000) show that our
data set does not violate the parallel regression assump-
tion. Thus, our data set is a good fit for the ordered logit
model.
5.3.2 Binary logit regression
The results of our analysis may depend on the nature of
our dependent variable, debt financing. To test their
robustness, we repeat our analysis in a binary logit
Table 4 Binary logit regression of debt financing
Debt financingb
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Control variables
Firm size (ln) .764* (.271) .001 (.366) − .105 (.449)
Club deal investments .877† (.468) 1.148* (.546) 1.351* (.615)
Current holdings − .033 (.023) − .029 (.028) − .037 (.031)
Moderators
Owner management − .015† (.008) − .004 (.013)
Firm age .066* (.033) .441* (.172)
SEWi .524 (.485) .037 (.902)
Independent variable
Type of investor − 2.431*** (.630) .336 (4.665)
Interaction terms
Type of investor × owner management − .034* (.016)
Type of investor × firm age − .431* (.172)
Type of investor × SEWi 1.016 (1.105)
Constant − 1.067† (.624) − .140 (2.270) − 2.900 (3.934)
Log-likelihood − 59.628 − 47.890 − 38.201
Pseudo-R2 .102 .279 .425
Observations 104 104 104
This table presents results for regressions with standard errors in parentheses
† p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
b Binary DV: debt financing (0 = no debt to finance DEI; 1 = debt to finance DEI)
Binary IV: type of investor (0 = PE firm; 1 = SFO)
SEWi, socioemotional wealth importance
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regression. Thus, we analyze the direct and moderated
effects on the binary dependent outcome, debt financ-
ing, coded as “1” if debt is raised and coded as “0” if no
debt is raised to finance DEI. Table 4 presents the
findings of the binary logit regression.
The results of the direct and moderated effects of the
binary logit regression (Table 4) are similar to the results
of the ordered logit regression (Table 3). First, model 2
shows that SFOs, in line with H1, affect debt financing
negatively and significantly (ẞ = − 2.431, p = .000),
which indicates that SFOs (coded as “1”) are less likely
than PE firms (coded as “0”) to use debt when investing
in DEI. In model 3, in line with H2, the interaction
between SFO and owner management has a negative
and significant effect on debt financing (ẞ = − .034,
p = .038). Moreover, the interaction between SFOs and
firm age is negatively and significantly associated with
debt financing (ẞ = − .431, p = .012), supporting H3.
Last, in line with our previous findings, the interaction
effect of the type of investor and SEWi does not signif-
icantly affect debt financing, rejecting H4. The pseudo-
R2 value of .279 for model 2 and of .425 for model 3
indicate good model fits. In sum, these findings provide
support that the results of the main model are robust to
alternative model specifications.
5.3.3 Power analysis test
Considering the restricted sample size of 104 SFOs and
PE firms, we conducted multiple power analysis tests of
two independent proportions to ensure that the sample is
acceptable in terms of size (Bush 2015; Cohen 1988).
Pearson’s chi-square test (N = 84; SFO = 40/PE firms =
44), the likelihood ratio test (N = 86; SFO = 41/PE
firms = 45), and Fisher’s exact test (N = 104; SFO =
50/PE firms = 54) provide support that our sample is
acceptable, both in terms of size and independent vari-
able distribution.
6 Discussion
6.1 Implications for research and practice
Although prior research on capital structures suggests a
substantial impact of ownership on financing decisions,
its empirical evidence has, to date, still been fragmented
and characterized by diverging results (e.g., Mishra and
McConaughy 1999), for instance, regarding the level of
debt of family-owned entities comparedwith other types
of firms (González et al. 2013; Mishra and
McConaughy 1999). Extant research on capital struc-
ture decisions within the family firm has found that
entrepreneurial families generally consider three types
of capital in hierarchical order: internal equity, external
debt, and last, external equity (Myers 1984), which
follows pecking-order theory (Gottardo and Moisello
2014).
By building on these findings, in this study, we aim
to go one step beyond and investigate the financial
decisions and debt preferences of entrepreneurial fami-
lies outside the family firm, particularly in an SFO. SFOs
constitute a fruitful context for debt discussions because
this type of investment vehicle allows families to dis-
tinctly and freely choose whether to raise debt (indepen-
dent of market challenges). However, to date, there is a
lack of research on the capital structures of SFOs, as
previous studies are primarily descriptive (e.g., Decker
and Lange 2013, Rivo-López et al. 2017) or qualitative-
ly analyze (e.g., Welsh et al. 2013) the investment
behavior of SFOs but fail to investigate the drivers of
capital structure decisions quantitatively. This research
gap is surprising given that scholars stress the need for
more research on SFOs (Welsh et al. 2013) due to their
unique exposition at the intersection between family
financial decisions and family ownership idiosyncrasies
(Rivo-López et al. 2017; Wessel et al. 2014).
To investigate SFOs’ capital structure decisions, par-
ticularly their debt preferences and the influence of the
unique aspects related to family ownership, we com-
pared family-owned SFOs and PE firms. In a first step,
we hypothesized and showed that SFOs follow pecking-
order theory (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984) and
thus raise lower levels of debt in the context of financing
DEIs than PE firms, which frequently follow a trade-off
approach with higher levels of debt. Moreover, in line
with the BAM (Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía 1998), we
argued for and empirically revealed that owner manage-
ment and firm age strengthen these relationships, where-
as surprisingly, the importance of SEW did not show a
significant moderation effect. We propose that the sig-
nificant moderation effects can be explained by in-
creased levels of loss aversion (Ariely et al. 2005).
Our study contributes to academic research in at least
the following two ways. First, we contribute to the
literature on family-owned SFOs and their capital struc-
ture decisions (e.g., Bacci et al. 2018; Gottardo and
Moisello, 2014; Koropp et al. 2013; Molly et al. 2019)
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by investigating debt preferences when making DEIs
outside the family firm in comparison with PE firms.
Our empirical findings thereby add to the literature by
indicating that SFOs (compared with PE firms) are less
likely to raise high levels of debt when financing DEIs
than PE firms. Thus, SFOs tend to rely solely on internal
financing and only raise debt when explicitly considered
(independent of market challenges). The previous fam-
ily firm literature has only considered family structures
in which debt was potentially needed to be raised be-
cause of certain market challenges (e.g., need to grow)
or in which raising external equity was the only option
to remain competitive (e.g., Sirmon and Hitt 2003). Our
results study a context (SFOs) in which business fami-
lies can freely decide to assume debt. We show that
SFOs, similar to family firms, follow pecking-order
theory (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984), while
PE firms follow the trade-off approach (Kraus and
Litzenberger 1973). Hence, SFOs significantly differ
from PE firms. SFOs as a unique unit of analysis thereby
also add to the research on debt financing in general
because they provide the unique opportunity to combine
both perspectives of the owning family and the capital
structure decisions within the investment (i.e., DEI)
context.
Second, with our empirical study, we answer various
calls to further investigate heterogeneity among SFO
capital structures (Welsh et al. 2013) as a potential result
of the idiosyncrasies stemming from the involvement of
an entrepreneurial family (Block et al. 2018;Welsh et al.
2013; Zellweger et al. 2012b) by comparing them to PE
firms without a family background (Rottke and Thiele
2018). Moreover, we analyze the moderating effects of
owner management, firm age, and SEWi on the debt
financing of SFOs. Our data support the importance of
considering the moderating factors of family ownership
by providing unique evidence that SFOs behave hetero-
geneously regarding varying degrees of owner manage-
ment or firm age. In contrast, SEWi does not seem to
affect the capital structure decisions of SFOs. Our de-
scriptive results, with a mean of 3.969 for SFOs and a
mean of 3.722 for PE, thereby challenge prior research
stating that SEW is only linked to family structures
(Gómez-Mejía, et al. 2007; Molly et al. 2019) and the
existence of a family firm (Chirico et al. 2019) and
indicate that nonfamily structures also regard noneco-
nomic goals as important. A driver for the high rating of
SEWi for PE firms might be the increasing importance
of reputation among competitors and towards outside
investors, employees, and potential sellers. Additional-
ly, our data challenge the assumption that entrepreneur-
ial families always consider noneconomic (Gómez-
Mejía, et al. 2007; Molly et al. 2019) goals but suggest
that differences regarding financing decisions between
family and nonfamily structures are based on economic
considerations.
In addition to those contributions to extant research,
our study also holds various practical implications. We
enable SFO-owning families and managers of PE firms
to benchmark themselves in terms of the debt levels and
idiosyncratic effects within the same peer group as well
as with their respective counterparts. Our study thereby
provides transparency and a more profound understand-
ing of competitors and investors in the SFO/PE market
and might enable owners and/or managers to adapt and
rethink capital structure decisions. Moreover, our find-
ings enable external stakeholders (e.g., nonowner man-
agers, advisors, debt suppliers, or service providers) to
better understand idiosyncratic factors that impact cap-
ital structure decisions. Last, we provide sellers of
established firms with more insights into a currently
opaque investor market (Amit et al. 2008; Cumming
and Groh 2018). Sellers of established firms may use
our findings to better assess the risk-taking behavior of
potential acquirers to more confidently negotiate a sell-
ing process.
6.2 Limitations and future research
Similar to other empirical studies, our study has some
limitations, many of which provide important avenues
for future research. First, although a focus on German-
speaking SFO-owning families and PE firms is reason-
able due to the economic salience in this country and the
comparison of entities with a similar legal and cultural
background, our results may not be generalizable to
other economic and/or cultural contexts. Second, our
sample is constrained in size, which is common in the
context of research on SFOs (Welsh et al. 2013) and PE
firms (Michel et al. 2020) given the small overall pop-
ulation, the difficulties in obtaining highly confidential
financial data, and the lack of transparency (Amit et al.
2008; Cumming and Groh 2018). To mitigate these
concerns, replication studies in similar and different
cultural settings are encouraged. Third, we measured
the ordinal dependent variable debt financing at a certain
point of time (i.e., the time of the interview), which
further limits the generalizability of our results.
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Although we followed the suggested debt categorization
by Schulze et al. (2003), empirical longitudinal studies
would be helpful to better capture generational, tempo-
ral, and market differences in capital structure decisions
within SFOs and PE firms.
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